

Price elasticity of demand:

"10% ↑ in the price of care leads to 2% less spending on care."

(How is "care" measured?)

As for health outcomes, negative impact on low income people with chronic illness.

Overall, not much impact on health (from reduction in care or from increase in price?)

Optimal Health Insurance

- Do not have first dollar coverage, little consumption smoothing benefit, significant moral hazard & admin. costs


→ Deductibles good.

- Definitely want catastrophic care. And, want generous coverage for these low probability, devastating events.

⇒ No caps, limited co-pay, esp. for chronic illness (may be still some moral hazard to manage)

Reaction to cap it, charge people to cover costs is not sound policy, at least by consumption smoothing theory.

At this point, revisits the "moral hazard" D curve, argues why it's wrong.



Not so.

- Last time: "I have insurance so that I can pay low prices for care when I need it."

- Where does this D curve come from?
 $U(c)$? No.

So far, just a Theory of financial risk management.

Need a broader Theory.

- The right Theory here is the same you'd have for homeowner's insurance. You get a new house (or expensive car) in low probability total loss events. No moral hazard there; an inefficiency if you are consuming health care in the bad state that you would not consume if you could get the money.

Supply Side

[Does supply/demand story really make sense here? Is it more of a bargaining model or some kind of (collective decisionmaking model between doctors & patients that fits reality better?)]

* Retrospective reimbursement

No incentive to treat "not-effectively".
Just "look back" and pay.

What does "not effective" mean if doctor complying with law and medical ethics?

Could that really lead to spending with low private value, high social cost?

If doctor pushes a procedure and personally substitutes her tastes for yours (risk aversion, feelings about side effects), maybe. Over sells the treatment, manipulates info, for some reasons (what is best in own personal judgement).

Or, their desire to give hope & relief \Rightarrow ongoing care/treatments with little probability of much benefit.

Prospective Reimbursement

- Pay based on what treatments "Should" cost, not actual cost.
- Capitation.
May go too far the other way,
too little incentive to treat.

Bottom line: Prospective payment systems and HMOs produced a 5-10 year period of level health spending increases, now back to increases in increases. Increasing faster than GDP increases, again.

Medicaid

- "Poor" is necessary, but not sufficient.

- "Poor" means federal poverty line.

All that follows assumes poor.

* If you are in a household that is below the poverty line and you are a child or a pregnant woman, you are covered.

* " " taking care of the child, likely to be covered (but not necessarily).

* Disabled (total disability), covered.

* Elderly (nursing homes), covered.


- Federal government shares costs with states. Matching rate varies with state income.

- In order to be part of program, state must cover children, pregnant women, some others (?) and must cover basic physician and hospital care.

- All states provide some additional benefits and get federal match for those (if program is in compliance or gets a waiver).


Prescription drugs, optometrist, some provide dental.

Selected Sources of Funds for Health Spending (As Shares of GDP)



Medicaid and health of poor

(consumption smoothing not discussed)
if on public assistance, get that
regardless of state, with Medicaid
you have smooth "c" non-health
(are consumption)



Big success in reduced infant
mortality. (Pregnant women &
children.)

Look at other groups now
eligible and the illness they
get that pregnant women &
children don't get, and see if
outcomes are better. *esp. those dropping
private insurance.*

Issue: "Crash out" from these expansions,
but Medicaid is really offering better
coverage, Does the crash out matter? *Look at
health
outcomes*